EVIDENCE ABOUT THE MORAL HAZARD IN THE ECUADORIAN HEALTH SYSTEM

Mercy Raquel Orellana Bravo, Juan Andrés Piedra Peña, Luis Santiago Sarmiento Moscoso

Abstract


The aim of this study is to estimate the presence of moral hazard in the Ecuadorian health system, understood as an over-utilization of it. For this, a binomial logit model, which measures the probability of use of health services between insured and uninsured people is used. The results show evidence of moral hazard for individuals who are insured, mainly for adults over 60 years. In addition, it is noted that when having extra expenses that are not covered by insurance, insured people tend to reduce the use of medical services.

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